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IS THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS
ACT FAIRLY CONSTRUED?
JOSEPH V. LANE, JR.t

THE prenatal history of the Fair Labor Standards Act' is replete with
expressions of lofty purpose and Utopian aims. Its birth was heralded as a great social advancement and, surprisingly enough, it has
proven for the most part to be the bonum which was intended. In
retrospect most people will agree that it has not lost with time its congenital qualities. But recently, the interpretation of the Act by some
of our courts has resulted in conclusions which are unfair, unjust and
inequitable. The courts have pointed to the Act and blamed its phraseology for their harsh conclusions. Is the Act to blame?
In March, 1943, Judge Murrah of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
wrote:
"Concededly, the employer acted in the good faith belief that the employment was not covered by the Act, or that the employment contract fully
complied with its requirements, and when it became reasonably apparent
that the employment did come within the Act, the correct amount of overtime compensation was determined in accordance with the prescribed formula
and voluntarily paid without legal compulsion and before suit was filed. If
any amount of good faith will excuse the payment of liquidated damages
imposed by Section 16(b), it would seem wholly justified by the unchallenged
factual findings of the Trial Court .... -2
It must indeed be a harsh statute which will drive a court to penalize
an employer who acts in good faith, reasonably and without legal
compulsion.
In October, 1943, Judge Swan, writing for the Second Circuit, said:
"It is urged that such a construction (the imposition of a penalty after
overtime has been paid) of the statute produces too harsh a result; but the
harshness is inherent in the legislation. We see no escape from the statutory
language." 3

In December, 1943, the New York Appellate Division (First Department) in a per curiam decision has the following to say in O'Neil v.
Brooklyn Savings Bank:4
t

Member of the New York Bar.

1.

52 STAT. 1069, 29 U. S. C. A. § 201-218 (1938).

2.
3.
4.

Seneca Coal and Coke Co. v. Lofton, 136 F. (2d) 359 (C. C. A. 10th, 1943).
Rigopoulos v. Kervan, - F. (2d) - (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
O'Neil v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 267 App. Div. 317, - N. Y. S. (2d) - (Ist Dept.
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"We appreciate that the results of our decision may seem harsh. The
harshness, however, is inherent .in the legislation and in the decisions which
have construed it. As was said in Rigopoulos v. Kervan (C. C. A. -2) 'We
see no escape from the statutory language' ".
In the O'Neil case the employee was a watchman in a loft building
from November 5, 1938 to May 3, 1940. Two years after leaving his
employment he met a friend who had been a fellow worker in the
building .and who told him that one of his former employer's officers
wished to see him as he had a check for him. When the employee called
at the office, he was told that a check for $423.16 for overtime wages
had been waiting for him, but that the employer had been unable to
locate him. The employee accepted the check and signed a general
release after that paper had been explained to him. The release recited that there was uncertainty as to whether the employee had any
enforceable claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act, that the amount
due, if any, was difficult of ascertainment and that the parties desired
to settle the claim by payment of the sum mentioned. Concededly, the
amount paid was the full amount of employee's claim for overtime wages.
An action for liquidated damages alone was then brought. Upon
the trial the employer offered substantial proof that plaintiff was not
covered by the Act. The trial court dismissed the complaint thus
resolving the disputed issues of fact in the employer's favor.
The Appellate Term reversed and the Appellate Division affirmed
such reversal by a divided court. Coverage was disputed on each appeal.
When O'Neil's employment was terminated on May 3, 1940, there
was not one authoritative appellate decision in the entire country5 in
line with the subsequent and startling decision by the United States
Supreme Court in Kirschbaum v. Walling6 which held that the Fair
Labor Standards Act was applicable to employees engaged in the maintenance and operation of a building whose tenants are engaged particularly in the production of goods for interstate commerce. Indeed
the earlier cases were to the contrary.7 Prior to the Kirschbaum case,
1943). On February 25, 1944, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Birbalas v. Cuneo
Printing Industries, Inc., - F. (2d) -, likewise found the statute "harsh."
5. Killingbeck v. Garment Center Capitol, Inc., 259 App. Div. 691, 20 N. Y. S. (2d)
521 (1940), appeal denied, 284 N. Y. 818 (1940). This was the earliest reported appellate

decision.
6. 316 U. S. 517, 62 Sup. Ct. 1116 (1942). "The closed door of finality is now open
to litigious bedlam." (1943) 29 VA. L. REV. 502, 504. See also (1942) 41 MIcn. L.
REV. 340.
7. Pederson v. Fitzgerald Construction Co., 262 App. Div. 655, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 989
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no one could reasonably question the good faith of an employer who
withheld the payment of overtime wages under the Act to employees so
engaged.
Section 7 of the Act
The sections of the Fair Labor Standards Act which have caused the
Courts so much difficulty are Section 78 and Section 16(b).' The Supreme Court has held in Overnight TransportationCo. v. Missel,10 that
Section 16(b) is mandatory in its application where the employer has
violated the Act.
In that case the employer refused to pay the overtime required by
the Act and made it necessary for his employee not only to bring suit,
(1941), aff'd, 288 N. Y. 687, 53 N. E. (2d) 83 (1942), cert. granted, 318 U. S. 740, 63
Sup. Ct. 558 (1942), aff'd, 318 U. S. 742, 63 Sup. Ct. 558 (1943), see also 266 App. Div.
1032, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 595 (1943); Cecil v. Gradioson, - Ohio St. -, 40 N. E. (2d)
958 (1941); Robinson v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., - Tenn. -, 158 S. W. (2d)
441 (1941); Fleming v. Arsenal Bldg. Corp. 38 Fed. Supp. 207 (S. 'D. N. Y. 1941),
rev'd 125 F. (2d) 278 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941). (The district court decision was concededly
a "test" case. N. Y. Herald Tribune, Mar. 22, 1941, p. 1). Accord Fleming v. Kirschbaum, 38 Fed. Supp. 204 (E. D. Pa., 1941), aff'd, 124 F. (2d) 279 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
See note 6 supra. Davisson, Coverage of thd F. L. S. A. (1943) 41 M cH. L. Rv. 1060.
8. "Maximum hours:
(a) No employer shall, except as otherwise provided in this section, employ any of
his employees who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for cqmmerce(1) for a workweek longer than forty-four hours during the first year from the effective
date of this section,
(2) for a workweek longer than forty-two hours during the second year from such
date, or
(3) for a workweek longer than forty hours after the expiration of the second year
from such- date,
unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above
specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is
Employed." 52 STAT. 1063, 29 U. S. C. A. § 207 (1938).
9. "Any employer who violates the provisions of section 6 or section 7 of this title
shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid
minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an
additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Action to recover such liability may be
maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for
and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated, or such
employee or employees may designate an agent or representative to maintain such action
for and in behalf of all employees similarly situated. The court in such action shall, in
addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action." 52 STAT. 1069, 29 U. S. C. A.
§ 216(b) (1938).
10. 316 U. S. 572, 62 Sup. Ct. 1216 (1942).
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but to go to the highest court in the country before the employer
would recognize that the employee-was entitled to the overtime. The
court's conclusion on Section 16(b) seems to be reasonable where the
employer has adopted an "I will not obey" attitude. The same might
also be said for the conclusion reached by Judge Swan in the Rigopoulos
case, for there the employer had refused to comply and would not agree
to pay overtime until the Administrator brought a plenary suit. Our
attention should be directed, therefore, to employees in the position
of Lofton"1 and O'Neil' whose employers went forward voluntarily and
paid overtime when the courts decided that their employees came within
the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Accepting Section 16(b) as mandatory, where the employee had to
resort to litigation before he-could get his overtime, let us examine Section 7 (a) and see if the employers of Lofton and O'Neil "violated" that
Section. Section 7(a) may be summarized as follows:
No employer shall. employ any of his employees for more than the prescribed time unless such employee receives compensation for his employinent
in excess of the hours prescribed at a rate not less than 132 times the regular
rate.
Both Lofton and O'Neil received compensation for their employment
in excess of.the hours specified at a rate not less than 1Y2 times the
regular rate at which they were employed long before each instituted
suit. Lofton, it is true, received only 99% of what was found to be due
to him, but O'Neil concededly received all. For present purposes we
shall consider Lofton as an employee who received 100% of his overtime compensation before suit; the court treated him as such. Congress has not stated when payment is to be made. Neither Section 7
nor Section 16(b) provides when such wage payment should be made,
whether by the week, month or year. The only requirement is that
the employee receive the specified compensation. Both Lofton and
O'Neil received it. Section 16(b) imposes liability upon an employer
who "violates" the provisions of Section 7. How can it be said that
an employer who performs the statutory requirement without even being asked by the employee to do so has "violated" that statute when
the statute did not advise the employer when the payment .should be
made?
It would appear that under a literal construction of Section 7 there
11.

See note 2 supra.

12. See note 4 supra.
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has been no violation by late payment of wages. As the United States
Supreme Court has pointed out, Congress avoided writing Section 7
along rigid lines. Even on such a basic point as "the regular rate" at
which a person was employed, the court found that Congress had provided no specific formula. 3 Although Congress did not say when the
payments should be made, the courts have implied promptness and
the duty to pay wages at the end of each pay period.' 4 By such implication they have reached the harsh conclusions which they deprecate and
the blame is put on the Act.
Employers can be protected ,from the extreme conclusion reached
by the courts in the Lofton and O'Neil cases by implying a rule of
reason. If the employer unreasonably refused to comply with the Act
when it was clear that he should have, the penalty should fall; but if
he voluntarily complied with the Act within a reasonable time after he
became aware of his duty to pay, there should be no penalty. 5 The
13. Walling v. Belo, 316 U. S. 624, 634-635, 62 *Sup. Ct. 1223 (1942): "The problem
presented by this case is difficult because we are asked to provide a rigid definition of
'regular rate' when Congress has failed to provide one. Presumably, congress refrained
from attempting such a definition because the employment relationships to which the
Act would apply were so various and unpredictable. And that which it was unwise for
Congress to do, this Court should not do. When employer and employees have agreed
upon an arrangement which has proven mutually satisfactory, we should not upset it
and approve an inflexible and artificial interpretation of the Act which find no support
in its text and which as a practical matter eliminates the possibility of steady income to
employees with irregular hours. Where the question is as close as this one, it is well
to follow the Congressional lead and to afford the fullest possible scope to agreements
among the individuals who are actually affected. This policy is based upon a common
sense recognition of the special problems confronting employer and employee in business
where the work hours fluctuate from week to week and from day to day. Many such
employees value the security of a regular weekly income. They want to operate on a
family budget, to make commitments for payments on homes and automobiles and insurance. Congress has said nothing to prevent this desirable objective. This Court should
not." See also Note (1942) 22 B. U. L. REv, 495; Note (1942) 16 TEmp. L. Q. 442.
14. Seneca Coal and Coke Co. v. Lofton, 136 F. (2d) 359 (C. C. A. 10, 1943);
Rigopoulos v. Kervan, - F. (2d) - (C. C. A. 2d 1943); O'Neil v. Brooklyn Savings
Bank, 267 App. Div. 317, - N. Y. S. (2d) - (1st Dept. 1943).
15. Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391, 46 Sup. Ct. 126 (1926): "That
the terms of a penal statute creating a .new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform
those who -are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its
penalties, is a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair
play and the settled rules of law. And a statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of
law." See also International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 216, 221, 34 Sup. Ct.
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New York Court of Appeals has specifically warned against giving effect
to an assumed Congressional intent in matters involving this Act.1"
Courts, in implying promptness with its harsh effect, fly in the face
of express Congressional intent. Nowhere, either" in the Statute or in
the Reports to the House and Senate or in the Congressional Debates,
has anything been found to indicate that Congress intended explainable
delay in payment to be treated as wrongful failure of payment; or payment without the necessity of suit -as the basis for creating double
liability. If Congress intended to penalize for delay alone, more apt
language could have been used.
The Congressional Intent
Oh May 24, 1937, the President sent a message to.Congress urging
the enactment of legislation "to help those who toil in factory and on
farm" to obtain "a fair day's pay for 'a fair day's work." Bills were
introduced in both the House" and the Senate"8 but when those bodies
could not agree on the form which the legislation should take, the
matter was referred to a Committee of Conferees from both Houses who
worked out their differences so that the message of the President be'came part of our body of laws. The Fair Labor Standards Act did not
become law until more than one year after the President's message. 9
It is clear from an examination of the Congressional Record that
Congress never intended to penalize an employer who voluntarily complied with the Act. Neither in the original House Bill nor in the-original
Senate Bill will anything be found which indicates an intention on the
part of Congress to punish innocent non-prompt compliance with the
Act. Neither of the original bills contained a section similar to Section
16. The provision for double damages first made its appearance in the
final bill.
853 (1914); Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 634, 638, 34 Sup. Ct. 924 (1914). In U. S.
v. Katz, 271 U..S. 354, 357, 46 Sup. Ct. 513 (1926), Stone, J., states "All laws are to be
given a sensible construction; and a literal application of a statute, which would lead
to absurd consequences, should be avoided whenever a reasonable application can be
given to it, consistent with the legislative purpose."
16. "We riiay not disregard the definitive language thus employed; nor may we by
judicial construction give effect to an assumed congressional intent. . . ." Stoike v. First
National Bank, 290 N. Y. 195, 202, 50 N. E. (2d) 246 (1943); cert. denied, - U. S. -,
64 Sup. Ct. 50 (1943).
17. H. R. 1452, 75th Cong., 1st Sess (1937)- 1-23.
18. SEN. R P. No. 884, 75th Cong., ls.t Sess (1937) 1-9.
19. June 25, 1938.
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In the conference report which accompanied that bill the full discussion regarding employees' remedies was this paragraph:
"Penalties"
"Sec. 16 of the conference agreement provides a fine of not more than
$10,000, or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both, for violation
of the Act. No person is to be imprisoned upon coniriction for a first offense.
This section also provides for civil reparations for violations of the wages and
hours provisions. If an employee is employed for less than the legal minimum wage, or if he is employed in excess of the specified hours without receiving the prescribed payment for overtime, he may recover from his employer twice the amount by which the compensation he should have received
exceeds that which he actually received."20
The Congressional understanding of Section 16, declared by the conferees who drew up the bill in its present form, clearly was that the
right to double damages would arise only where it became necessary
for an employee to sue for the difference between what he had received
and what he should have received. In the cases under consideration
each employee, without suing, received the amount which he should
have received. Following the formula of the Congressional conferees,
an employee such as Lofton or O'Neil is entitled to nothing because
no overtime compensation was owing when he started his suit.
The only reference in the discussions in either Chamber to the matter
6f enforcement appears in the following paragraph of the remarks of
Representative Keller, a member of the conference committee:
"Among the provisions for the enforcement of the Act an old principle has
been adopted and will be applied to new uses. If there shall occur violations
of either the wages or hours, the employees can themselves, or by designated
agent or representatives, maintain an action in any court to recover the wages
due them and in suck a case the court shall allow liquidated damages in addition to the wages due equal to such deficient payment and shall also allow a
reasonable attorney's fee and assess the court costs against the violator of the
law so that employees will not suffer the burden of an expensive lawsuit. The
provision has the further virtue of minimizing the cost of enforcement by the
Government. It is b6th a commonsense and economical method of regulation.
The bill has other penalties for violations and other judicial remedies, but the
provision which I have. mentioned puts directly into the hands of the employees who are affected by violation the means and ability to assert and enforce their own rights, thus avoiding the assumption by Government of the
sole responsibility to enforce the Act. ' 21
20.

83 CONG. REc. 9255. (1938).

Italics added.

21.

83 CONG. REc. 9264 (1938).

Italics added. See Reese, Concurrent Jurisdiction of
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What better evidence could there be of congressional intent than the
3tatement of Representative Keller, who, as a conferee, was one of the
draftsmen of the bill? He does not say that an employee has the right
to sue for liquidated damages alone after his employer has voluntarily
complied with the Act; on the contrary, he definitely states that if there
are violations the employee may go to court to recover the wages due
and "in such case the Court shall allow liquidated damages ... ." If
the employee has to sue for overtime he may get liquidated damages.
In describing the conference bill on the floor of the House, one of the
members of the Conference Committee stated:
"So instead of being harsh your conferees have attempted to be sensible in
this matter, and exemptions have been made and definitions have been placed
in the bill which make it possible to bring a measure here which retains the
22
best features of the House bill and good features of the Senate measure."
As another of the conferees said:
"A genuinely democratic spirit of adjustment characterized everything that
was done and said by members in a resolute effort to write a bill that would
be practicable, fair and at the same time constitutional,

.

. .,,23

The Congressional Record does not throw too much light on the
thoughts of the Senate, since most of their debates were dedicated to the
constitutional questions involved. We do find, however, that Senator
Walsh, who was Chairman of the Senate Conferees, answered in a
memorandum, many of the questions which had been placed before him.
One of such questions is:
"Q. What effect will the application of this sudden and rigid regulation of
employment and wages have upon industry?"
After considering the effect on smaller business, the Senator makes the
following answer:
"A.

.. . In my opinion, unless this law is carefully and prudently adminis-

tered, it will tend to increase monopolies and eliminate smaller industries.
To be successful, the law, with its commendable humanitarian objects, must be
administered with the caution, care and sympathy
of a physician and not with
24
the autocracy and force of a police officer."1

State and Federal Courts under Section 16(b) of F. L. S. A. (1941) 27 VA. L. Rxv. 328,
333-4.
22. 83 CONG. REc. 9258 (1938).
23. 83 CoNG. Rmc. 9264 (1938).
24. 83 CONG. Rzc. 9176-77 (193.8).
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The thoughts of the legislators are of utmost importance in construing
a statute and it has been said:
"That in order to form a right judgment whether a case be within the
equity of the statute, it is a good way to suppose the law maker present, and
that you have asked him this question; 'Did you intend to comprehend this
case?' Then you must give yourself such answer as you imagine he, being
an upright and reasonable man, would have given. If this be that he did
mean to domprehend it, you may safely hold the case to be within the equity
of the statute, for while you did no more than he would have done, you do
not act contrary to the statute, but in conformity thereto.1 25
Did our Congress, as reasonable men, intend to penalize an employer
who voluntarily complied with the Act and paid all overtime prescribed
in the statute within a reasonable time after it became clear that the
statute applied to his employees? Did our Congress, as reasonable
men, intend to punish an employer which sought out a former employee
within a reasonable time after the United States Supreme Court held
that such employee was covered by the Act?
Here there is no need to speculate as to what the legislators would
have answered to the questions above propounded. Their answers were
given before the Act was passed. They tell us that any implication
should not produce a result which will be harsh or unfair-it must be
reasonable. In the dissenting opinion in the O'Neil case the court
said: "The statute has specified no time when the overtime wages must
be paid. The intention to permit a reasonable time for payment should
be inferred." 2 6 This seems to be the first cautious, careful and sympathetic treatment of the subject and it reflects the hand of a physician
rather than the club of a police officer. Although this quotation represents the view of the minority of the court, it does reflect the Congressional intent. It protects the employee against an unreasonable employer and it likewise protects a reasonable employer from an unwarranted penalty.
25. 6 BACON's ABRIDGEMENT (6th ed. 1793) 386. See also Donahue v. Keeshan, 91
App. Div. 602, 87 N. Y. Supp. 144 (1904); People ex rel. Manhattan Ry. Co. v. Barker,
152 N. Y. 417, 46 N. E. 875 (1897); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506, 22 N. E. 188 (1889),
(1889) 5 L. R. A. 340; U. S. v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 61 Sup. Ct. 481 (1941) which upheld
the constitutionality of the statute and examined its legislative background.
26. See Callahan, J., dissenting in O'Neil v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 267 App. Div. 317,
- N. Y. S. (2d) - (1st Dept. 1943).
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Section 16(b) of the Act
Further evidence of the fact that Congress did not intend the penalty
to apply if the employee had been paid is indicated by an analysis of
27
Section 16(b).

Under Section 16(a) no fine or imprisonment may be imposed upon
the employer until he has twice violated the Act, and each of such violations must be wilful. Even then the maximum imprisonment can be
but six months. Congress declined to concern itself with technicalities
and specifically provided no criminal liability for those who might be
guilty of a single wilful violation of the Act. With this background, we
pass to Section 16(b) and find in the first sentence thereof that the employer who violates the Act "shall be liable to the employee . . .in the
amount of ... unpaid overtime compensation ... and in an additional

equal amount as liquidated damages."
In the quoted sentence Congress admonished the employer that if he
violated,"s that is, failed to comply with the statute, he would be liable
to the employee for unpaid overtime and an equal amount as damages.
The conjunctive "and" was used and not the disjunctive "or." In other
words, the employer who made th6 employee sue for unpaid overtime
compensation might be sued for both the compensation and the penalty.
Congress did not say that if the compensation were paid the employer
might be sued for the penalty alone; it said exactly the opposite.
In the second sentence of Section 16(b) we are told that "action to recover such liability may be maintained. . .

."

Such liability refers to

the matter mentioned at the end of the first sentence of the section, viz.,
unpaid overtime compensation and liquidated damages.29 Again no au27. See note 9 supra.
28. There may of course be a violation of law despite ignorance of the application
of a statute. This rule is but a corollary to the well known maxim: "Ignorantia legisneninem excusat.' Here however a reasonable delay in payment does not violate one
word, one phrase or one clause of Section 7a, unless we are to substitute judicial legislation for the expressed language of Congress.
29. "The argument of plaintiff's counsel that the provided liquidated damages of
double the amount of alleged overtime service, plus the amount of a reasonable attorney's.
fee-both of which are provided for in the Federal Act-are neither to be considered in
computing the jurisdictional amount for an appeal, is most non-convincing, since both
of such items of recovery by plaintiff are expressly provided for in the act, as much as
deficiency in compensation. They are all grouped by the act as component parts for
which entire recovery may be had. Neither of those items is recoverable at all unless
compensation for overtime service is due under the act ... " Sneider v. Justice, 293 Ky.
126, 168 S. W. (2d) 591,-592 (1943).
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thorization is given to recover liquidated damages alone. The third sentence begins with the words "The court in such action shall . . . allow
a reasonable attorney's fee. . . ." Suck action refers to the action au-

thorized in the previous sentence, that is, an action to recover both
unpaid overtime and liquidated damages.
The very wording of Section 16(b) shows that Congress intended
the penalty to apply if itbecame necessary for an employee to institute
suit to recover the overtime compensation. There is nothing anywhere
in the Act to indicate that Congress considered the statute to be "violated" if the employer voluntarily paid the overtime compensation, thereby making it unnecessary for the employee to resort to the processes
of law.
Administration of the Act
The Wage and Hour Administrator has taken no positive position on
this subject. There have, however, been many -expressions in support
of the position here taken.3" The Administrator advocates reasonableness.31 A reasonable time is, of course, a relative term and, as the Administrator points out, may vary depending on the circumstances. It
may be implied to accomplish what Congress intended. It has become
a well settled policy that in the administration of the Act employers
have been permitted to make restitution of statutory wages legally
30. WAGE AND HOUR MANUAL (1942) 729: "Stripped of legal verbiage what does it
mean? (Referring to Section 16(b) of the Act.) Simply, that if, for example, your
employer owes you $100 under the Act, you can go to court, prove your case and thereupon the employer will have to pay you not $100 but $200." Id. at 703: "A further
restraint upon the potential violator is the separate and independent remedy. afforded under
Section 16(b), which enables 'employees affected by violations of the minimum wage or
overtime provisions, or the representatives of such employees, to bring suit for the collection of wages legally earned but unpaid, plus -an equal amount as liquidated damages, costs
in the action and reasonable attorney's fees."
31. WAGE AND HOUR MANUAL (1940) 120, (1941) 165: Making Payments for Overtime.
"Question: Is there any time limitation on payment of overtime to employees on
monthly salary basis? May overtime compensation be accumulated for payment quarterly, or possibly even annually, in order to reduce clerical work?
"Answer: (Genetal Counsel) Our Regulations, Part 516 which are the only regulations
dealing with questions of wages and overtime compensation do not specify any particular
date on which wages (including overtime compensation) must be paid. So long as
payment of overtime compensation is made within a reasonable time after earned, it
would seem that the provisions of Section 7(a) 'unless such employee receives compensation' would be complied with. Accumulation for as long as a month before payment
would appear to be payment within a reasonable time. Perhaps accumulation for a quarter
would likewise be deemed reasonable, depending on the circumstances."
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earned but unpaid where the "violations" have been unwitting and
unintentional.3 2
Further evidence of Congressional intent can be found in the fact that
the Administratorn despite his sweeping powers under the Act, clearly
has no standing to sue an employer for liquidated damages under
Section 16(b) of the Act. Congress did not give the Administrator
power to compel such an employer to pay twice. This supports the
contention that the Congressional scheme was that such damages were
recoverable only where the individual employee, at his own expense,
conducted litigation against an employer, whose conduct made litigation
necessary. "'An old principle has been adopted and will be applied
to new uses. 3 3
The above quoted statement by Representative Keller indicates that
there is statutory precedent for suit by employees to recover their wages.
There are many statutes so operating. 4 But the only federal statute
which purports to penalize for tardiness is the Seaman's Act, an Act
which expressly provides for the imposition of a penalty for delay in
payment without sufficient cause.
Even there the courts would not
permit the imposition of a penalty if the employer was reasonable or if
the delay was unavoidable.36 A stricter attitude towards the employers
of seamen is particularly pertinent because the latter are "wards of the
courts ' 3 7 and "are a class of persons remarkable for their rashness,
32. ANNUAL REPORT, WAGE AND Hou ADMNISTRATION (1941).
33. See note 21 supra.
34. WALSH-HEELEY AcT, 49 STAT. 2036 et seq., 41 U. S. C. A. § et seq.; THE M:uxER
ACT, 49 STAT. 793-4, 40 U. S. C. A. § 270a-c; N. Y. LABOR LAW § 565, 220.
35. SEAmAN'S AcT, 38 STAT. 1164, 46 U. S. C. A. § 596 (1915), 41 STAT. 1006, 46
U. S. C. A. § 597 1920). "Every master or owner who refusps or neglects to make payment
in the manner hereinbefore mentioned without sufficient cause shall pay to the seaman
a sum equal to two days' pay for each and every day during which payment is delayed
beyond the respective periods, which sum shall be recoverable as wages in any claim made

before the courts." 38 STAT. 1164, 46 U. S. C. A. § 596 (1913). See also Reese, Concurrent Jurisdictionof States and Federal Courts under Section 16(b) of F. L. S. A. (1941)
27 VA. L. REV. 228, 238-9: ". . . the closest analogy to 16(b) on this point seems to be
Section 596 of the Federal law regulating shipping."
36. Collie v,Ferguson, 281 U. S.52, 50 Sup. Ct. 189 (1930); McCrae v. U. S., 294
U. S.23, 55 Sup. Ct. 291 (1935); Morgan v. Eastern Transportation Co., 31 F. (2d) 327
(E. D. Va. 1927), affd, 31 F. (2d) 332 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929); Gold v. Matsom Navigation
Co.,'73 F. (2d) 808 (C. C. A. 9th, 1934).
37. Petterson v. U. S., 274 Fed. 1000, 1003 (S.D. N. Y. 1921). See also Bonici v.
Standard Oil Co, of N. Y.,. 103 F. (2d) 437 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939); Sitchon v. American
xport Lines, 113 F. (2d) 830 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940); Hume v. Moore-McCormack Lines,
121 F. (2d) 336 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
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thoughtlessness and improvidence."3 Yet the courts have not permitted
them "to catch at penalties, where they suffered no wrongs.""
Releases
The, Act is silent on the subject of release or accord and satisfaction
and, the courts, despite the fact that Congress in the final bill eliminated
a non-waiver clause which had appeared in prior bills' have for the
most part held releases to be ineffectual without any analytical explanation therefor. The conclusions have been varied and it has been held
that employee's claims may not be compromised for less than full overtime plus liquidated damages (where there has been delay in payment); they may be settled for full overtime;4 2 they may be settled
for less than full overtime; 43 and finally, they may be settled for less
than full overtime if it is an arm's length transaction.44
The best known case is Guess v. Montague.' There the Fourth Circuit upheld as a valid accord and satisfaction a release given for full
overtime. There is a dictum to the contrary in the Seventh Circuit4 6
in a case which did not involve a release and a conflict has been
suggested.4" The Guess case has been criticized on the theory ,that
Congress lumped overtime and liquidated damages together48 in 16(b)
and "probably did not intend that any right created for the employees'
benefit should be subject to coercive compromise in a market where
38. Story, J., in Brown v. Lull, 2 Sumner 443 (U. S. 1836).
39. Petterson v. U. S., 274 Fed. 100, 1003 (S. D. N. Y. 1921).
40. "Sec. 20 . . . (b) any contract, agreement, understanding, condition, stipulation, or
provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this Act or with
any regulation or order thereunder shall be null and void." SFN. REsP. No. 844, 75 Cong.
1st Sess. (1937).
41. O'Neil v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 267 App. Div. 317, 319, - N. Y. S. (2d) - (1st
Dept. 1943).
42. Guess v. Montague, - F. (2d) - (C. C. A. 4th, 1943).
43. David v. Atlantic Co. - Ga. -, 26 S. E. (2d) 650 (1943).
44. Cissel v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 37 Fed. Supp. 913 (W. D. Ky. 1941);
Schnell v. Park-Lexington Co., Inc., - Fed. Supp. - (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
45.

-

F. (2d) -

(C. C. A. 4th, 1943).

46. Fleming v. Warshawsky, 123 F. (2d) 622 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941). But in Birbalas v.
Cuneo Printing Industries, Inc., - F. (2d) -, see note 4 supra, the same circuit recognized
a distinction between employees who were forced to sue for overtime and those who were
paid in full before suit.
47. Rigopoulos v. Kervan, - F. (2d) - (C. C. A. 2d, 1943). See also Gangi v. Schulte,
Inc., - Fed. Supp. - (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
48. See note 20 supra.
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bargaining power is unequal." 49

As already suggested, the lumping of

-overtime and liquidated damages in Section 16(b) indicates that Congress contemplated a suit for both overtime and liquidated damages
and not a suit for liquidated damages alone. The Guess case was for
liquidated damages alone. Further, there is nothing in the case which
indicates a coercive compromise, nor is there anything in the case to
indicate that the employees were entitled to liquidated damages whether
or not the release had been executed.
In the case of Gangi v, D. A. Schulte, Inc.,5 0 the court made the following comment on a suit by an employee who in compromise had received overtime and executed a release:
"The plaintiffs had the option of bringing the suit and taking the risk of
recovering nothing or avoiding that risk by the acceptance of a compromise"
proposal. Having exercised their option and pocketed the price of the release
executed and delivered by them I see nothing in the law which compels the
courts to permit them to play 'heads I win, tails you lose.'
"The assertion of this claim is sharp practice, offensive to every moral instinct, and assiduous search of the statute fails to reveal anything which renders
it fair or legal."
The critics of the Guess case apparently feel that it conflicts in principle
with the doctrine of Seneca v. Lojton.5 1 This was suggested to the
Supreme Court in the Lofton case,5 - but certiorari was denied.43
There is some force to the argument, that a settlement for less than
100% overtime is violative of public policy. But if the 100% has
been paid, public policy should approve such a settlement and the
recognition by the employer of the application of the statute. If penalties are to be, the same whether the employer voluntarily complies
with the statute or deliberately refuses, Section 16(b) becomes a strong
49.
50.

-

(1943) 57 HARv. L. RE.v. 257, ,258.
Fed. Supp. - (S. D. N. Y. 1943).

51. 136 F. (2d) 359 (C. C. A. 10th, 1943).
52. "The employer in the Fourth Circuit and the employer in the Tenth Circuit each
paid full overtime before being sued. Each payment was intended to be payment in full.
Each employer was later sued for liquidated damages and attorney's fees. One was held
liable, the other was not. Although the Fourth Circuit attempted to avoid the appearance
of direct conflict with the decision of the Tenth Circuit in the present case by suggesting that
there the employee did not accept the employer's payment in full settlement, the opinion of
the Tenth Circuit shows that this was not the ground for its decision and that a direct conflict does exist between the Circuits." Brief filed in support of petition for certiorari in
Seneca Coal and Coke Co. v. Lofton, 136 F. (2d) 359 (C. C. A. 10th, 1943).
53. Cert. denied, Seneca Coal & Coke- Co. v. Lofton, - U. S. -, 64 Sup. Ct. 77 (1943).
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reason for non-compliance rather than a deterrent. Settlements are favored in the law and if by a settlement the employee receives full overtime, the Congressional Mandate has been satisfied, the statute has been
fulfilled and a proper accord and satisfaction has been consummated.
Concusion,
The Fair Labor Standards Act should be liberally construed to give
effect to its humanitarian purposes and to insure to employees full payment of the overtime prescribed, but we see no reason whatever for
brushing aside some of the fundamental principles of law and equity
for the benefit of litigious, employees whose overtime has been fully
paid. 4
It would seem that the courts have been unnecessarily unfair in
interpreting the Act which is most flexible and can be applied so that
justice and equity is done to employer and employee alike. The intent
of Congress can be carried out by reasonable implication wherever
necessary. As in the question of coverage," 5 the correct interpretation
of 16(b) and of settlements under the Act, will not be set at rest until
our Supreme Court speaks, but whatever the conclusion of that Court
may be it cannot properly be based upon the "harshness" of the statute.
54. ". . . If this is the proper construction of the Act, then we may well ponder
whether it" is one 'to help those who toil in factory and on farm' to obtain 'a fair day's
pay for a fair day's work', as the Presidential Message stated in recommending the legislation, or one to -aid litigious clients and their lawyers." Callahan, J., O'Neil v. Brooklyn
Savings Bank, 267 App. Div. 317, 323, - N. Y. S. (2d) - 1st Dep't 1943).
55. See note 7 supra.
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